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Abstract. Following the INTERPOL’s definition, money laundering is: “any act or attempted act to conceal or disguise 
the identity of illegally obtained proceeds so that they appear to have originated from legitimate sources”. Illegally 
obtained funds are laundered and moved around the world using front companies, intermediaries and other money 
transmitters. In this way, the illegal funds remain hidden and are integrated into the legal economy. Such type of crime 
undermines financial institutions’ and jurisdictions’ reputation, compromises investors’ trust in them, and therefore 
weakens the entire financial system. By using annual data for the Italian regions (NUTS-2) over the period 2008 to 2015, 
this work aims to investigate the determinants of money laundering in Italy. Given the high heterogeneity in terms of 
economic and institutional characteristics, as well as for the activity of organized crime in financial-related activities, 
Italy is a compelling case study. Our main findings reveal that in most of the Italian regions enforcement activities do 
exert significant deterrence on criminal behaviors: a negative relationship between enforcement and illegal trafficking of 
waste can be identified only for very high levels of enforcement efforts. Moreover, we find that the major determinants 
influencing the rate of money laundering differ between northern-central and southern regions, confirming the existence 
of a regional dualism. In particular, while in the northern-central area the crime rate is positively related to the level of 
corruption, the incidence of mafia-type crimes and negatively to the education attainment, in the southern regions money 
laundering is positively related to the size of the gaming and gambling sector. 
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Introduction 
Money laundering represents the process of taking the proceeds generated by criminal activity and giving such 
proceeds an appearance of legality1. Money laundering not only allows criminals to move their money through society 
freely, without attracting attention to the underlying activity or the persons involved but also prevents the funds from 
being confiscated by the judiciary authority2. The IMF estimates that the amount of money laundered globally in one 
year is between 2 and 5 per cent of global GDP, or roughly U.S. $1–2 trillion annually. According to the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in 2009 criminals have laundered around US$ 1.6 trillion which 
corresponds to 2.7 per cent of the global GDP.  
Traditionally, money laundering has been described as a process that takes place in three distinct stages. In the 
initial – or placement – stage, money launderers introduce their illegal proceeds into the financial system through 
deposits, wire transfers, or other means. In the second – or layering – stage, money launderers move such funds around 
the world to separate them from their original source. Finally, in the third – integration – stage money launderers re-
enter funds into the legitimate economy investing them into real estate, luxury assets, or other business ventures.  
Money laundering might determine severe economic consequences for a country (Schneider, Windischbauer 
2010). Using front companies to disguise the ill-gotten gains, money launderers might crowd out legitimate firms that 
suffer a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis firms that do not draw capital funds from legal financial markets. In 
                                                            
1 The term money laundering was coined by the Guardian during the Watergate Scandal and was referring to the illegal movement 
of US President Nixon’s campaign contributions to Mexico and then back to the US through a company in Miami.  
2 Huge amounts of proceeds are generated by illegal arms sales, smuggling, and the activities of organised crime, such as drug 
trafficking and prostitution rings. Other activities such as embezzlement, insider trading, and bribery can also produce large profits 
and create a stimulus to “legitimise” the ill-gotten gains through money laundering. 
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addition, the investments of money launderers are mainly driven by the desire of hiding their proceeds instead of 
making profits; this implies that such investments might be of a low quality and/or not economically beneficial to the 
country3. 
The main purpose of this paper is to analyse the determinants of the money laundering in Italy using a panel 
dataset over the period 2008–2015. Given the high heterogeneity in terms of economic, social and institutional 
characteristics, as well as for the activity of organized crime, Italy is a compelling case study. In this context, we 
attempt to answer the following research questions: i) what are the main factors driving this type of crime. ii) To what 
extent is the existing enforcement system effective in deterring it? iii) Is there any degree of territorial heterogeneity 
on the determinants of money laundering? 
The present study contributes to the extant literature on the economics of crime in several ways. First, it explicitly 
analyzes a specific type of financial crime, which presents the higher degree of sanctioning regime in the Italian 
legislation. Second, Italy represents a quite important country study because of the strong presence of mafia clans and 
organized crime systems operating in the illegal market. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 
outlines some stylized facts about money laundering in Italy. Section 3 reviews the main theoretical and empirical 
literature and points out some hypothesis to be tested. Section 4 describes the dataset and the empirical model, while 
the results are illustrated in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
Some stylized facts about money laundering in Italy 
The incidence and the evolution of money laundering in Italy can be illustrated with some descriptive statistics that 
refer to the number of violations denounced at the Authorities (Fig. 1). Starting from 2011 the level of offences has 
sharply increased. A possible explanation can be due to the change in the Italian legislation on money laundering 
(D.lgs. 231/2007) that has been approved in Italy after the third anti-money laundering European Directive.  
In particular, this law has obliged not only the credit institutions (bank, postal, insurance, e-money institutions) 
and the financial ones institutions (trust companies, promoters, brokers), but also – and this is the most significant 
novelty – several legal or natural persons acting in the exercise of their professional activities (i.e., auditors, external 
accountants and tax advisors, notaries and independent legal professionals, trust or company service providers, real 
estate agents, casinos, etc.). The above-mentioned categories are attributed to the following obligations: i) adequate 
customer due diligence (arts. 15–35), ii) registration (arts. 36–40), and iii) reporting (arts. 41–48). 
 
 
Fig. 1. Number of offences denounced by law enforcement at the authority of justice (2011–2015) (Source: ISTAT 2017) 
Although we can observe a greater crime emergence, the exchange of knowledge and information between 
institutions and control authorities has been effective in slowing down the crime incidence in every single Italian region 
(Fig. 2). The emergence of money laundering is higher particularly in Lombardia, Piemonte and Liguria for the North 
of Italy; Toscana and Lazio, for the Centre of Italy; Campania, Sicilia and Puglia for the South of Italy.  
                                                            
3 This can be the case when some industries (i.e. hotels) are financed only for a short-term and then abandoned, causing a collapse 
of these sectors. 
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Fig. 2. The total number of reported case of offences denounced by law enforcement at the authority of justice (2012–2015) 
(Source: ISTAT 2017) 
Definitively, anti- money laundering national legislation has received a fundamental influence by the European 
law.  
Since 1991, UE has approved four Directives (I Directive- 91/308/CEE, II Directive- 2001/97/CE, III Directive- 
2005/60/CE- in Italy D.lsg 231/2007-, IV Directive- 2015/849/CE efficacies from June 2017) that are been adopted by 
Italian Parliament. We have asserted that the most relevant is the third one that have been adopted in Italy by the D.lgs. 
231/2007.   
This act, and its implementation, has changed the policies of money laundering contrast: in particular, this law 
has led to the cooperation of the Italian Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF with domestic i.e. the magistracy, the Bureau 
of Anti-mafia Investigation and other authorities) and foreign (other FIUs) counterparts and with international 
organizations such as the FATF.  (UIF 2015, 2016a). The last Directive, that will be approved in June 2017, follows 
the same ideas, but in a stronger way.  
By considering the financial data analysis conducted by Italy’s Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF), Figure 3 shows 
a relevant increase of the flow of suspicious transaction reports filed to the Italian antimoney laundering authority 
between 2012 and the first semester of 2016. In conclusion, it is clear that money laundering is a strong risk in Europe, 
and only with a common strategy it is possible to contrast it (Gilmour 2016; Yasaka 2017). 
 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016- I sem. 
Numbers 
             
Suspicious transaction reports received  67.047 64.601 71.758 82.428 52.049  
                        
Suspicious transaction reports transmitted 
to investigation authorities  
60.078 92.415 75.857 84.627 52.343  
               
Percentage   
              
Suspicious transaction reports received 36,6 –3,6 11,1 14,9 33,6  
  
Suspicious transaction reports transmitted 
to investigation authorities 
96,4 53,8  –17,9 11,6 29,7  
Fig. 3. Suspicious transaction reports filed to Italy’s Financial Intelligence Unit -2012- I sem. 2016-Isem  
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Theoretical background and hypotheses 
In order to develop some testable hypotheses that guide the empirical analysis, we have considered a set of determinants 
that include socio-economic, enforcement and crime-specific factors. First, with reference at the principal money 
laundering literature (Masciandaro 2007; Ahmad 2015; Braun et al. 2016; Ebikake 2016), potential criminals are 
profit-maximizers who make their decisions on illegal action in order to maximize the expected utility. In particular, 
criminals commit the crime when the expected benefits of offending are greater than the expected costs of compliance.  
Assuming that “crime asks crime” and based on a personal consideration, we can assert that countries with a higher 
rate of criminality continue to increase their level of offences.  
Therefore, we may derive the following research hypotheses to be tested empirically. 
Hypothesis 1: A lower level of the economic activity leads, ceteris paribus, to a higher (lower) rate of crime.  
The literature on the economics of crime has largely stressed the role of the legal income opportunities in affecting 
the benefits and costs of crime. Theoretically, the relationship between the level (growth) of income and crime is quite 
ambiguous. On the one hand, higher income opportunities may increase the chances for employment in the legal sector 
and therefore reduce the crime rate. This statement seems to be supported by the fact that since 2007 in the global 
economy, as in a “butterfly effect”, many types of crimes, and money laundering, have increased as people got poorer 
and more desperate for money (Rose-Ackerman, Søreide 2013). On the other hand, higher income opportunities makes 
people better off and, as a result, potentially raise the revenues from crime. 
Hypothesis 2: A higher level in education leads, ceteris paribus, to a lower (higher) rate of crime.  
Education is an important factor that affects criminal activities. This influence might be either positive or negative 
for the crime development. On the one hand, higher levels of educational attainment, being associated with higher 
returns in the labor market, may increase the opportunity cost of criminal behavior. On the other, education may 
influence personal preferences in a way that affects decisions to engage in crime, bringing about a sort of “civilization” 
effect (Fajnzylber et al. 2002).  
Hypothesis 3: A higher size of the shadow economy, leads, ceteris paribus, to a higher rate of crime.  
Institutional factors are an important determinant of crime and of money laundering. For instance, (Vaithilingam, 
Nair 2007) find less money laundering activity in countries with strong institutional capacity, effective legal and 
regulatory frameworks, and efficient governance structures. Using the size of the shadow economy as a proxy to 
measure the efficiency level of the legal framework, we can therefore conjecture that well-established legal and 
institutional structures promote a more effective contrast of crime behaviour. 
Hypothesis 4: A higher size of the gaming and gambling sector leads, ceteris paribus, to a higher rate of crime. 
This hypothesis supports the analysis on the money laundering process that takes place, as we have seen before, 
in three distinct stages: “placement”, “layering” and “integration”. In particular, the gaming and gambling sector might 
play an important role in the third section of the “money laundering pyramid”; that is, the integration stage when funds 
re-enter the legitimate economy (Starola 2012). The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recognized that gaming and 
gambling houses represent a great risk for money laundering activities4.. Although gaming and gambling rooms are by 
definition non-financial institutions, they undertake various financial transactions that put them at risk of money 
laundering. The UK Gambling Commission (UKGC) has communicated that between April 2014 and March 2015 
bookmakers filed 633 suspected money laundering operations to the National Crime Agency. 
Hypothesis 5: A higher presence of mafia-type organized crime leads, ceteris paribus, to a higher rate of crime. 
In Italy, mafia-type organized activities are particularly deep-seated. Ab illo tempore, Italian authorities fight 
against this type of crime that is strictly related to money laundering. For example, some recent investigations have 
found that several famous restaurants and hotels in Milan, Turin and other northern cities are becoming 'ndrangheta 
properties which uses them as fronts for laundering cash. To this purpose, in order to intercept the financial flows of 
the mafia clans, since 1973 criminal justice authorities have adopted the strategy of the “follow up the money”, as 
suggested by the Italian magistrate (Falcone 2010).  
Hypothesis 6: A greater IT environment leads, ceteris paribus, to a higher rate of crime. 
The spread of the computer and communication equipment-based information technologies have blurred the 
boundaries and interconnected national economies. A hyper-connected business ecosystem that frequently straddles 
national jurisdictions may facilitate the development of new forms of crime (Eurasian Group 2014).  In particular, in 
the last years we have observed the strong increase of the “cybercrime” which has led to the building of an international 
                                                            
4 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an independent inter-governmental body that develops and promotes policies to protect 
the global financial system against money laundering and terrorist financing. 
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factory of crime (Castaldo, Naddeo 2010). Some specific features of electronic payment systems may be induce 
potential money laundering risks. The high speed of transactions, including cross-border money transfers, and the low 
expenses related to such transactions decrease the cost of money laundering services and may therefore facilitate 
various money laundering schemes.  
Hypothesis 7: The higher rate of corruption leads to, ceteris paribus, a higher rate of crime. 
Corruption and money laundering are two intrinsically linked types of crime. Corruption crimes, such as bribery 
of theft of public funds, are generally committed for the purpose of obtaining private gain. By successfully laundering 
the proceeds of a corruption offence, the illicit gains may be enjoyed without fear of being confiscated (FAFT 2011). 
It should be noted that in certain areas the higher the corruption level, “the more ruinous the destruction of the social 
capital” (Draghi 2011); as a result, corruption may set in motion a vicious circle of social destruction and decay.  
Hypothesis 8: The stronger the enforcement and deterrence efforts are, ceteris paribus, the lower is the rate of crime.  
Both the theoretical (Becker 1968) and empirical literature (Cohen 2005) have postulated that deterrence variables 
are important determinants of the expected utility that potential offenders can yield from crime. So, a higher probability 
of conviction or severity of punishment leads to a reduction in the expected utility from crime and, therefore, less 
offense will be committed. 
Data description and empirical strategy 
Our panel dataset contains annual observations from 20 Italian regions over the period 2008 to 2013. The dependent 
variable is the rate of crime measured by the number of money laundering crimes reported to the judicial authorities 
per 100,000 resident population in each region-year.  
Following the main literature on the economics of crime, we include the following variables in our model. First, 
to address the deterrent effect on criminal behavior, we use the conviction rate defined as the number of defendants 
convicted by a final judgment per 100,000 resident population in each region-year. We have also considered its squared 
term in order to control for a possible non-monotonic relation. Moreover, to account for some specific characteristics 
of money laundering, we use the following variables: i) the number of activities relating to gaming and gambling, ii) 
the corruption rate, iii) the incidence of mafia, and iv) the degree of information technology (IT) penetration. Finally, 
we complete our dataset by including some socioeconomic variables that reflect the legal income opportunities of 
potential criminals. In particular, we insert into our model the rate of real GDP growth, the rate of irregular 
employment, and the share of population that has completed the university. A detailed description of the variables, 
their definition as well as the statistical source is provided in Table 1. 
Table 1. Definition of variables used (Source: authors) 
Variable Definition Source 
Money laundering rate The number of money laundering crimes reported to the judicial 
authorities per 100,000 resident population in each region-year  
ISTAT 
GDP growth The rate of growth of the real GDP at 2005 constant prices ISTAT 
Education The number of people with university degree per 100,000 resident 
population in each region-year 
ISTAT 
Shadow economy The rate of irregular employment in each region-year  ISTAT 
Gaming and gambling The number of lottery, bets and game rooms per 100,000 resident 
population in each region-year 
ISTAT 
IT penetration  The share of employees that use computers with internet connection in 
their work in each region-year  
ISTAT 
Incidence of mafia  The ratio of mafia-type crimes over organized crimes in each region-year ISTAT 
Corruption rate The number of convicted defendants for corruption crime by a final 
judgment  per 100,000 resident population in each region-year 
ISTAT 
Conviction rate The number of convicted defendants for money laundering crime by a 
final judgment per 100,000 resident population in each region-year 
ISTAT 
 
Based on the extant literature, we implement in this section a simple crime model (Rickman, Witt 2007; Machin, 
Meghir 2004). It posits a relationship between the annual reported crime in each region and a set of explanatory 
variables that are derived by socioeconomic, deterrence and crime-related factors.  
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The estimation equation takes the following form: 
 '  0 1          it it it t itlnmoneylaundering a lnmoneylaundering X yearβ γ ε−= + + + + , (1) 
where the subscripts i and t represent the region and time period, respectively. The dependent variable (ln money 
laundering) is the crime rate, while the explanatory variables are a set itX  of socioeconomic, crime-related specific 
and deterrence variables. The lagged crime rate in the previous year was inserted into the model in order to identify 
possible dynamics in crime. As a matter of fact, the economic crime literature has identified the possibility of criminal 
hysteresis or inertia (Fajnzylber et al. 2002); in other words, higher crime today is associated with higher crime 
tomorrow. Crimes that were committed in the past may affect current criminal behavior for several reasons. First, 
criminals can learn by doing, acquiring some level of adequate criminal know-how, which allows them to reduce 
expected cost of carrying out criminal acts (Case, Katz 1991). Moreover, convicted criminals are likely to have less 
legal job opportunities, thus reducing their personal cost of participating in criminal activity and making the 
commission of crime more attractive. Variable tyear   is a time effect that captures the common variations in crime 
rates across regions and removes the correlation amongst regions. Finally, itε  stands for a well-behaved error term 
distributed IID (0, σ2). The dependent variables and all explanatory variables were natural logged to alleviate the 
problem caused by the skewed distributions of some variables. This also simplified calculation of the percentage 
change of crime rates for a one percent change in each explanatory variable (elasticity). Table 2 summarizes some 
basic descriptive statistics of the variables used in estimations while Table 3 shows the correlation matrix. 
Table 2. Basic descriptive statistics (Source: composed by the authors) 
 Obs Mean St.Dev. Min Max 
Money laundering 
rate 
120 2.5341     1.8800          0.4 13.3 
Conviction rate 120 1.6033 1.7303 0 9.443 
Shadow economy 120 13.802 5.6136 7.1 30.9 
Education 120 475.48 178.17 116.97 1202.009 
IT penetration   120 25.93818     7.799221        10.8  51,4 
GDP growth 120 .01196 .02338 –.05715 .0674 
Gaming and 
gambling 
120 75.179 125.31 3.0636 1677.404 
Incidence of mafia   120 2.374 1.7702 0 14.9 
Corruption rate 120 1.9036 4.1171    .04131 33.344 
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix (Source: composed by the authors) 














1.00        
Corruption 
rate 
–0.06 1.00       
Education 0.13 –036 1.00      
GDP growth 0.48 –0.02 –0.03 1.00     
Shadow 
economy 
–0.13 0.04 –0.06 –0.09 1.00    
Conviction 
rate  
0.05 0.05 –0.05 –0.01 0.15 1.00   
IT 
penetration   
–0.15   0.26 –0.31   –0.09 –0.04 –0.21 1.00  
Incidence of 
mafia   
–0.05 –0.12     0.15  –0.09    0.54 0.07 –0.33 1.00 
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Results 
We estimate the balanced panel data linear model using feasible generalized least square (FGLS). Table 4 shows the 
results of the model applied to all Italian regions during the period from 2008 to 2013. In the estimates for the total 
country, we observe that the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is positive and statistically significant. This 
suggests that money laundering crime is highly persistent over time and may be attributed to the fact that costs of 
criminal behavior reduce over tine as criminals learn by doing and the moral loss of breaking the law is reduced by 
crime itself. The conviction rate is positive and statistically significant. This result is quite unexpected and differs from 
the majority of the existing literature on economics of crime, because the cost of breaking the law should reduce the 
crime rate. However, a possible explanation may be that deterrence does not yet effectively prevent crime: if deterrence 
would be stronger, then one would expect to see reduction in the number of money laundering crime. Convictions 
could be an insufficient indicator for deterrence and the positive significant relationship might reflect the suggestion 
of previous authors that criminals do not consider the likelihood of the negative consequences of committing a crime. 
In addition, our findings could mean that criminal sanctions may not be the most effective solution, given the fact that 
such type of criminals are usually companies for which administrative sanctions and interdiction measures, (i.e., 
measures that interrupt a company’s business) tend to have a stronger deterrent effect than criminal sanctions. 
However, the negative and significant coefficient of its squared terms reveals the existence of a hump shaped relation 
between money laundering and law enforcement efforts. Our result indicates that conviction rate exerts its deterrence 
effect on criminal behavior only after a certain threshold level it has been reached. Thirdly, we find that the number of 
gaming and gambling halls in the region has a positive effect on money laundering. As we have previously said, these 
activities are related to various financial operations that put them more and more at risk of money laundering. Fourthly, 
money laundering tends to be higher in those regions where higher is the rate of corruption. This is in line with a strong 
empirical evidence showing that corruption and money laundering are intrinsically linked: corruption generates huge 
proceeds that need to be laundered in order to be given an appearance of legality. Lastly, the empirical analysis indicates 
that education attainment has a negative and significant effect on the pervasiveness of money laundering at 10 per cent 
level. The result suggests that higher educated people have higher moral stances that discourage them to participate in 
illegal criminal activities. Finally, the coefficients on GDP growth rate, incidence of mafia, shadow economy, and IT 
penetration are not statistically significant. 
Table 4. The determinants of money laundering in Italy (Source: composed by the authors) 
Explanatory variables Coefficients Robust standard errors 
Lagged money laundering rate  .2318826***    .0848185           
Conviction rate .8520366***   .2051701           
Squared conviction rate  –.2458579** .1074105     
Shadow economy  .0295384    .1238074     
Education –.2154139*    .1117944              
IT penetration   .0332283    .0534906 
GDP growth .1416273       1.740225      
Gaming and gambling  |   .3760306***    .0976457      
Incidence of mafia   .0072606       .0354589      
Corruption rate .1032778*** .0397394      
Constant .0490129    1.287045 
Time dummies Yes  
   
Number of observations 100  
Wald chi2(12)       235.27  
***, **, *indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels.  
 
In order to account for the structural and relevant differences between Italy’s north and center on the one hand 
and the south on the other, we estimated the crime equation for each of these territorial aggregations. For this, we used 
panel datasets for the 12 regions belonging to the north and center and for the remaining 8 regions belonging to the 
south of Italy.  
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Table 5 displays the coefficient estimates for the northern and center regions. Looking at columns (i) and (ii), we 
see that the lagged crime rate is now not statistically significant indicating the absence of any persistence in crime. 
Furthermore, our findings show that law enforcement variables do not lead to significant deterrence of criminal 
behavior: while the conviction rate is positive and significant, its squared term is not. Moreover, our results show that 
money laundering in the north-center area is also driven by both the incidence of the mafia-type organized crime and 
the corruption rate. Several investigations have documented the widespread infiltration of different mafia organizations 
in the Centre-north regions5. However, unlike in the south, where the Mafia has a thorough and sometimes violent 
control over society, its influence in this area is mainly economic and often hidden. The strong link between organized 
crime and corruption have been emphasized by the Italy’s Financial Intelligence Unit (2015), that has pointed out how 
corruption has become a means for organized crime to infiltrate the public sector and condition its choices, extending 
its penetration of the economic and social structure. Particularly interesting is the case of the construction industry. 
Because of the financial crises, the strong difficulties that have beset construction firms had given mafia families the 
opportunity to penetrate this sector, which represents an easy place to launder money and to use corruption in public 
procurement. Finally, education attainment exhibits a negative and a significant effect on the crime rate indicating that, 
as previously schooling increases the returns to legitimate work, raising the opportunity costs of illicit behavior. 
Table 5. The determinants of money laundering at Italian sub-national level (Source: composed by the authors) 
 North-Centre of Italy South of Italy 
Explanatory 
variables 
Coefficients Robust standard errors Coefficients Robust standard errors 
Lagged money 
laundering rate  
.1263905         .1000782 .2592097    .1854028 
Conviction rate .8573544***         .2777864 1.383742*** .3941709      
Squared 
conviction rate  
–.1363101     .166461     –.4696065**     .180609 
Shadow economy  .484191      .40264 –.0898593    .7920805 
Education –.3265024***    .1234183 –.7223074    .2815605     
IT penetration   –.1251508    .1335918     .0317984     .143161 
GDP growth –3.03481    3.221425     2.020578     2.40551      
Gaming and 
gambling 
.2867276    .2022576 .4577015***       .1442866   
Incidence of mafia   .1832722**    .0816641      –.0059865    .0454134     
Corruption rate .2278701***    .0535571      .0684227    .0598178      
Constant –.3241273    1.171457 3.184613    3.917056 
Time dummies Yes  Yes  
     
Number of 
observations 
60  40  
Wald chi2(12)       133.42***  79.86***  
***, **, *indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels.  
 
The picture slightly changes when we consider empirical results for the southern regions, as displayed in column 
(iii) and (iv) of Table 5. First, lagged crime rate is again statistically not significant. In addition, as for the deterrence 
variable, we find that in the southern Italian regions law enforcement measures related to money laundering exerts a 
significant deterrence effect on criminal behavior only after a certain threshold level it has been reached. In particular, 
the conviction rate is positive and significant whilst its squared term exerts a negative and statistically significant. 
Thirdly, the number of gambling and games activities in these regions has a positive and highly significant impact on 
the pervasiveness of money laundering. In an area where the level of industrial development is low, crime groups find 
                                                            
5 According to the Parliamentary Anti-mafia Commission (2015), “Lombardy, with its capital Milan, is the power hub from which 
the ‘Ndrangheta (the Calabrian mafia) has spread throughout northern Italy”. For example, Milan and northern Italy are major 
areas of cocaine and narcotics trafficking. 
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more profitable to invest and hide their drug or racketeering profits in the gambling industry instead of in the more 
traditional agriculture or trucking sectors.  
Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the determinants of the money laundering in Italy using a panel dataset over the period 2008–
2013. Our empirical results revealed that in most Italian regions enforcement activities do not exert significantly deter 
criminal behavior. Only very high levels of enforcement efforts reduce money laundering. Moreover, the outcomes 
show that the major determinants of the money laundering rate differ in Italy between northern-central and southern 
regions, confirming the existence of a regional dualism. In particular, while in the north-center area the crime rate is 
negatively related to the level of education and positively to the incidence of mafia and the corruption rate, in southern 
regions money laundering activities are positively related to the size of the gambling industry. Such a different 
panorama may be the result of a different strategy of criminal organizations that adapt their schemes to integrate illegal 
funds into the legal economy to the different economic and social environments. In particular, criminal organizations 
choose the gambling sector in the less developed areas while in the richest areas they invest in other sectors such as 
waste management and construction where stronger is the interaction with politicians and, therefore, the probability 
to undertake corrupt actions.  
In conclusion, two main questions arise: are the actual policies to contrast money laundering effective? If they 
are not, which policies should be adopted?  In Italy the reports of suspicious bank transactions have increased 
substantially in the last years showing not only the FIU’s ability to handle the increased flow of information but also 
to improve its cooperation with domestic and foreign counterparts and with international organizations. However, like 
in the tale: “The boy who cried wolf”, it has been noted (Takàts 2011) that excessive reporting can dilute the 
information value of report, failing to identify what is truly relevant. Moreover, according to Mafia’s prosecutors 
legalizing gambling in Italy has created new opportunities for the organized crime providing the perfect cash-only 
business for mobsters, always on the lookout for legal ways to earn and launder money.  
In the medium run, we believe that the best strategy to contrast money laundering should allow sound 
intermediaries to reach a Pareto optimal solution where the benefits (in terms of better reputation and economic 
incentives) obtained from contrasting criminal behavior should be higher than those obtained by the entry in the crime 
market.  
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